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MacIntyrean metaepistemology, as Baldwin presents it, is a second-
order (or meta-level) reflection of our epistemic practices, standards, and 
systems. As such, it is related but also orthogonal to first-order theories 
of warrant and justification such as Phenomenal Conservatism (PC), 
Proper Functionalism, and Classical Evidentialism. Thus, the MacIntyrean 
approach is not necessarily an alternative to these first-order theories.1 In 
what follows, we aim to show how PC incorporates many of the insights of 
MacIntyrean metaepistemology while addressing some concerns.
Notice first that there are moderate as well as extreme readings of nearly 
all of MacIntyre’s key theses. Take Baldwin’s claim that “there is no tradition-
independent way to evaluate the epistemic merits of our religious beliefs 
and practice, no such thing as tradition-independent rationality, and no 
such thing as religious-epistemology-as-such that applies universally across 
all religious traditions.” Such statements might be taken in a moderate 
way, claiming only that our inquiry into the rational standards governing 
religious belief will be heavily influenced by our various traditions and, 
as a result, different individuals operating in different traditions might 
reasonably come to different conclusions about which rational standards 
are correct. Or such statements can be taken in an extreme, relativistic way, 
claiming that there is no objective truth as to who is right about the rational 
standards governing our beliefs.
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Taken straightforwardly, many of Baldwin’s statements strongly suggest 
the extreme reading. He asserts, “there is no such thing as universal rationality 
or theoretical-rationality-as-such, but rather that there are numerous rival 
tradition-based standpoints each with their own particular standards of 
rational justification.” For comparison, what would we make of an ethicist 
who asserted, “there is no such thing as universal morality or morality-as-
such, but rather that there are numerous rival tradition-based standpoints 
each with their own particular standards of morality?” We would interpret 
them as a moral relativist—someone who denied the existence of tradition-
transcendent moral truths. At best, this would be a particularly misleading 
way to express the more moderate claim that, though there are objective 
moral truths, people coming from different traditions will often come to 
different conclusions about those truths.
Despite such statements, it appears to us that both MacIntyre and Baldwin 
proffer these theses in their more moderate senses. That is, they stress the 
importance of traditions in guiding our inquiries, beliefs, concepts, practices, 
and so on, but maintain that there are tradition-transcendent truths and that 
these are at least sometimes accessible to us. At times, Baldwin seems to 
assert this plainly: “I maintain that there are and that we can know some 
tradition-transcendent truths.”2 He mentions in particular necessary truths, 
such as those of logic. We will assume, then, that Baldwin does not deny that 
there are universal, tradition-transcendent standards of rationality, but is 
merely pointing out how profoundly our investigations into such truths are 
guided by the tradition in which we find ourselves.
It is important to emphasize, then, that if we have correctly identified 
PC as a necessary truth about the nature of justification, then PC is such a 
tradition-transcendent truth. (For the record, PC states that if it seems to S 
that p, then S thereby has some degree of justification for believing p, absent 
defeaters.) Baldwin’s point is just that our ability to recognize PC as true 
depends on the tradition in which we are located, and that people operating 
in different traditions may not have the resources needed to appreciate its 
truth or might even be reasonable in dismissing it. We would agree with 
this point.3 What is reasonable to believe ultimately depends on how things 
seem to a person, and things may seem different to people from different 
traditions.
On a more general level, we also agree with Baldwin and MacIntyre that 
traditions and communities play a much larger role in epistemology than 
Enlightenment rationalists supposed. However, we do not think that this 
is a straightforward epistemic role, but rather largely a causal role. Many of 
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Baldwin’s arguments point to traditions as necessary conditions for organizing 
our language, concepts, and beliefs. We agree. But in what sense does this make 
tradition necessary? It is necessary causally, not epistemically. For example, 
oxygen is also necessary (in some sense) for our beliefs to be justified—for 
without oxygen, there would be no beliefs at all. But that is not to say that 
oxygen plays an epistemic role as part of what makes a belief justified or 
unjustified. Similarly, a community’s beliefs or standards do not themselves 
make a belief justified or unjustified, at least not in any straightforward way. 
Rather, having a community of thought is a necessary causal condition for 
formulating your own seemings, thoughts, and beliefs,4 and it is these things 
that play the epistemic role in the justification of one’s beliefs.
The position we are taking here is complicated, so allow us to explain it 
in another way. We agree that one’s tradition has a profound influence on 
what one is justified in believing; we just want to stress that this influence 
is indirect—it exerts this influence by causally altering experience. The 
story goes like this:  One’s tradition affects one’s conceptual frameworks, 
linguistic practices, and background beliefs. These affect one’s experiences 
of the world. And how one experiences the world ultimately determines, 
in accordance with tradition-transcendent rational standards, what one 
is justified in believing. Importantly, communal beliefs and standards do 
not automatically become normative for an individual operating within 
that tradition (otherwise one would be justified in believing whatever 
one’s community accepts, regardless of how these beliefs fit with one’s own 
experiences).
To its credit, PC allows us to accept what is true here—namely, that 
our communities and traditions greatly affect our seemings and therefore 
what beliefs are justified for us—without accepting that the standards of 
rationality differ from tradition to tradition or that it is rational to accept 
all and only the beliefs and standards of one’s own initial tradition. In this 
way, PC captures what is true about MacIntyrean metaepistemology while 
avoiding potential pitfalls.
Another big advantage of PC highlighted by Baldwin’s discussion is 
that PC can make sense of why one is justified in accepting one’s tradition-
dependent starting points. In order to help establish the tradition-bound 
nature of our epistemic starting points, Baldwin looks to Aristotle, whose 
philosophical methodology held that philosophy should start with the 
common opinions of one’s community (endoxa) and attempt to clarify 
and elaborate upon them, only rejecting them as a last resort.5 Notice, 
though, that endoxa are not rock bottom. These endoxa, as Aristotle himself 
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recognizes, are based upon the way things appear to people (phainomena).6 
Even our communal beliefs and standards are based on the way things seem, 
thus confirming the claim of PC that experiences form the evidence on 
which our justification depends.
Lastly, we think that PC fits nicely into MacIntyre and Baldwin’s 
tripartite schema:  tradition-based perspectivalism, Enlightenment hyper-
rationalism (represented by the encyclopedists), and postmodern deniers 
of truth (such as Nietzsche). PC fits best with perspectivalism, allowing 
for enough objectivity to avoid postmodernism and enough subjectivity to 
avoid hyperrationalism. Postmodernism says, if it seems true then it is true 
(for that person). PC counters, if it seems true then it is reasonable to believe 
(for that person), but the truth of the belief remains an entirely objective 
matter. On the other side, PC avoids the hyperrationalist position that 
reasonable inquirers will all reach the exact same conclusions. PC allows 
for a perspectival view of rationality, where what is reasonable to believe 
depends on the information available from one’s subjective point of view.7 
Since the available information can differ greatly from subject to subject, 
rational inquirers can come to vastly different conclusions. In short, PC 
gives us the best of both worlds:  it affirms objective truth and tradition-
transcendent standards of rationality so as to avoid postmodernism; and 
it also incorporates a humane, perspectival, and even tradition-dependent 
account of evidence so as to avoid hyperrationalism.
